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Background
The study by Crossley and colleagues,1 in this issue of the BJPsych,
is a rare and therefore welcome empirical contribution to the
debate, recently revived, on whether the distinction between
psychiatric and neurological disorders is real and/or should be
abandoned.2 Psychiatric disorders are not just ‘mental’ but
physical too.
The ‘reality’ of the psychiatry–neurology distinction, refers to
the soundness of its theoretical basis. This might be best
summarised by the following rule: if a disorder in question is
reliably associated with a recognisable pathological process
affecting the central nervous system (CNS), then it is neurological.
But that of course just begs questions about what is meant by
‘reliably’? Does this mean ‘necessary and sufficient’ to cause the
condition? What is ‘recognisable pathology’? Does this refer to
the microscopic or macroscopic level? What then do we make of
‘quantitative change’ in the CNS in relation to some normative
standard of a given magnitude? Is that ‘pathology’?
If we take schizophrenia, there is ample evidence of quantitative
regional change in the CNS thanks to the widespread use of
structural magnetic resonance imaging, but only insofar as this
is detectable at the group level against a control group and
according to some more or less arbitrary statistical threshold.3
The same can be said of affective disorder but at a rather lower
statistical threshold. So are these neurological disorders? Perhaps,
yet we do not see much interest among our neurology colleagues
to start seeing these patients or engaging in research on them.
What then of Alzheimer’s disease? Clearly a neurological disorder
and of interest to a few neurologists, but ‘core business’ for the old
age psychiatrist and a shared topic of interest for research. Hence,
the discussion moves rapidly from philosophy (is the distinction
real?), through biology (is there evidence of a pathological
process?), to sociology, culture and prejudice (whose job is it?
who gets the credit/blame?).
Crossley et al’s meta-analysis
The paper by Crossley and colleagues takes a novel approach.1 It is
a meta-analysis of studies using voxel-based morphometry (VBM)
to measure changes in grey matter in neurological and psychiatric
diagnostic groups. So there are studies of diseases as diverse as
multiple sclerosis and Huntington’s disease, Asperger syndrome,
anorexia and Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia and panic
disorder, each comparing a patient group with controls and
reporting statistical differences in, strictly speaking grey matter
density used as a proxy for volume change, usually with, areas
of reduced grey matter mapped onto a brain template.
Importantly, these methods look at the whole brain and are not
influenced by prior assumptions of where the abnormality might
be. The authors applied some basic quality controls over the
included studies and applied weightings according to the numbers
of participants but were interested in the broad pattern that such
large data-sets might reveal.
Now, you might question the whole enterprise. Is it not like
going into a general hospital, picking patients from the cardiac
ward, the renal unit and the orthopaedic department and sticking
them in a scanner? Little surprise then if the results showed that
abnormalities tended to centre on (although not being confined
to) the heart, the kidney and the skeleton, respectively? But it is
not quite the same since both psychiatry and neurology are laying
claim to the same organ, the brain. Going along with the idea one
might then hypothesise that neurological patients show the bulk
of abnormalities in the areas of the brain associated with more
‘basic’ functions: movement, sensation and, with respect to
dementia, memory, whereas psychiatry patients show differences
in ‘higher’ brain regions associated with self-consciousness and
identity (the frontal lobes) or emotion (the ‘limbic system’).
The results were more nuanced. First and foremost, there was
a clear and statistically robust difference between the two classes of
disorder. Second, the pattern was to some extent in line with
predictions but with surprises. Summarising the data both
quantitatively and qualitatively, the basal ganglia and insula clearly
fell on the neurological side of the divide as did primary sensory
and motor networks. However, so did the dorsal prefrontal
‘executive’ region, which might not have been envisaged. On the
other hand the area that came out as clearly ‘psychiatric’ was
the medial prefrontal region, an area with a growing reputation
for functions concerning self-reflection and social cognition.4 This
region is part of the so-called ‘default mode network’, thought to
be involved in awareness and stimulus-independent thought,5
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which was generally less implicated in studies of neurology
patients and includes attentional systems reaching back to the
posterior cingulate cortex. An unexpected and frankly odd finding
was that regions of the visual association cortex were significantly
more allied with psychiatric disorders. These included the lingual
gyrus, which may after all be genuinely important given its role in
face perception. The temporal cortex was, perhaps predictably, the
truly contested area – containing both the hippocampus
(reflecting the arbitrariness of regarding dementia as neurological
or psychiatric) and components of the limbic system, as well as
being a key area of epilepsy pathology, such as mesial temporal
sclerosis.
Context
This is not the first global look at grey matter across diagnoses. A
recent meta-analysis of VBM studies with similar methods has just
been published by Goodkind and colleagues, this time focusing
just on psychiatric (Axis I) diagnoses, but including all published
data rather than just representative samples.6 This study found
reduced grey matter in both anterior cingulate and insula cortices
to be common across all disorders, concluding these areas could
represent a ‘shared neural substrate’ for mental illness. It is
interesting to note that the insula in this study was also found
to be a key psychiatric region, whereas it came out as associated
with neurological disease in Crossley et al’s study. Again, this
ambiguity is perhaps not surprising given the large body of
evidence linking the insula with emotion processing, motor
function and – a true interface between mind and body –
introception.7
There are a few limitations to get out of the way. The studies
do not take into account medication. There is controversial
evidence that antipsychotic medication can alter brain structure,
for example increasing volume loss.8 Somewhat less
controversially, traditional antipsychotics have been found to
cause increases in basal ganglia volumes.9 Hence, what we may
be seeing here is the interaction between diagnosis and
medication. Also, neither study was confined to grey matter and
as psychiatric neuroimaging techniques advance and spread (for
example encompassing more diffusion tensor imaging) we would
expect more studies on white matter and connectivity to be
published and to contribute to this debate.10
Conclusions
The results may be taken as a slap in the face to the distinction-
abolitionists, yet such individuals might take heart in them in that
there is no implicit hierarchy in what emerges as the brain-based
hallmark of neurological versus psychiatric conditions; they both
involve the functionally interesting parts of the brain, it is just that
they are, quite subtly, different.
Perhaps one lesson that we can all take from this novel and
ingenious work is that we need to continue to use every ounce
of our brains to answer the question of what makes a psychiatric
disorder. As McHugh & Slavney11 wrote in their thoughtful The
Perspectives of Psychiatry:
‘In the everyday world of the clinic, psychiatrists are distinguished from other medical
specialists not because they are concerned with ‘‘minds’’ rather than ‘‘bodies’’, but
because they focus on complaints appearing in people’s thoughts, perceptions,
moods, and behaviours rather than their skins, bones, muscles and viscera . . . The
diagnostic process may be difficult, but causal explanations are always complex
and depend on the physician’s capacity to evaluate issues ranging from intermediary
metabolism (a ‘‘body’’ issue) to interpersonal misunderstanding (a ‘‘mind’’ issue).
Psychiatric concerns thus extend from the ultrastructure of the body to the relationship
of groups of minds within a social context.’
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